

29 AUG 1973

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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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
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CHINA

PARTY CONGRESS REFLECTS ENHANCED AUTHORITY OF CHOU COALITION

Meeting in secret without prior announcement, the Chinese have held their party congress to formalize the results of the Lin Piao affair and to sanction a new leadership coalition marked by Chou En-lai's enhanced authority. The CCP's 10th congress, held from 24 to 28 August "at a time when the Lin Piao antiparty clique has been smashed," was not announced until the day after it closed. Mao presided and was accorded his honorific title of "great leader,"* but he did not speak at the congress, as he had at the previous one in April 1969. The political report, delivered at the previous congress by Lin, was given by Chou, whose status second only to Mao was reflected also in the leader rankings at the congress. The 29 August press communique, the only document thus far available, also reported that rising star Wang Hung-wen delivered the report on the revision of the party constitution and that a new central committee was elected.

In addition to expelling Lin, "the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, counterrevolutionary doubledealer, renegade and traitor," the congress also expelled Chen Po-ta, "principal member of the Lin Piao antiparty clique, anticommunist Kuomintang element, Trotskyite, renegade, enemy agent and revisionist." This marked the first official public denunciation of Lin and Chen. The communique treads gingerly around "the other principal members" of the Lin clique, the central military figures in the Politburo who were purged in the fall of 1971. The communique notes merely that the congress supported unspecified decisions and "all the corresponding measures" taken with regard to these unnamed figures.

While formally announcing the expulsion of Lin and Chen, the congress communique calls for continuation of the campaign of criticizing Lin and rectifying the style of work, using the Lin clique as a teacher by negative example. This suggests that the congress' main purpose was to dispose of the Lin affair at the top ranks but that no new policy lines have been determined. On the international front, the communique stresses the line on drawing wide support against "the hegemonism of the two superpowers," naming the United States ahead of

* In his last appearance, receiving two Chinese-American doctors on 2 August, Mao was called merely "the leader" of the Chinese people. See the TRENDS of 8 August 1973, pages 12-13.

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the Soviet Union. In a striking reference to Sino-Soviet tension, the communique calls for vigilance in particular against "surprise attacks by social imperialism." Though the communique fails to use the formulation that Moscow's "social imperialism" represents a danger greater than old-line imperialism, such a reference to a possible Soviet strike reflects the Chinese leaders' fundamental suspicion toward Moscow.*

Judging by the leader rankings given in the press communique's account of congress proceedings, Chou and his allies in a party-centered coalition have consolidated their power in the process of overcoming the Lin affair. The communique lists a congress presidium of Mao as chairman, Chou, Wang, Kang Sheng, Yeh Chien-ying, and Li Te-sheng as vice chairmen, and Chang Chun-chiao as secretary general. If the pattern of the ninth congress holds, this group will form the new Politburo Standing Committee. Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan, generally regarded as radical elements who may be the source of recent sniping at Chouist policies, are ranked in another group that might largely compose the remainder of the Politburo. The two incumbent Politburo members who are military regional leaders, Hsu Shih-yu and Chen Hsi-lien, are included in this second-level group.

The strength of Chou and his allies was demonstratively reflected in appearances during the course of the five-day congress. On the second day, reports on the attendance of all of the active Peking-based Politburo members at an international table tennis tournament registered Chiang Ching's change in status. In the live television coverage and the original NCNA report of the event, Chiang was listed in her normal position ahead of Chou's close associate Yeh Chien-ying, but all the later reports reversed that order. There had been two precedents for Yeh ranking ahead of Chiang, including one last March at a time when the leadership was evidently engaged in major deliberations.

* Sinkiang party chief Saifudin, who was elected a full member of the new Central Committee, was present at his Urumchi home base on the 26th for the opening of the region's trade union and women's congresses. Speaking in that border area, Saifudin named "Soviet revisionism" ahead of "U.S. imperialism" and warned about the "aggressive nature of Soviet revisionist social imperialism." His speech was carried in the Sinkiang media.

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Midway in the congress, on the 26th, Peking signaled the political strength of Chou by resurrecting two former Politburo members who had fallen victim to the cultural revolution. Tan Chen-lin and Uianfu, the most important officials to be rehabilitated since former secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping resurfaced last April as a vice premier, were named by NCNA as attending the table tennis tournament that day. No titles were given for them in the NCNA report, but both were included in the list of full members of the new Central Committee elected at the congress.

The return to grace of Tan, an agricultural specialist whose expertise must be welcome now, is the most dramatic testimony to Chou's ability to fill the leadership void created by the Lin affair with leaders who had been purged during the cultural revolution. Reviled by name in the central media, Tan was accused of seeking to protect government offices from Red Guard attack. According to Red Guard sources, Tan was attacked by Chiang Ching for "opposing the great proletarian cultural revolution and attempting to write off the achievements of the great proletarian cultural revolution." The cultural revolution's achievements hardly figure in the 10th congress communique, which mentions that event only in noting that the new Central Committee includes "young comrades who newly joined the party" during the cultural revolution.

BACKGROUND The ninth congress, meeting for over three weeks in April 1969, was announced on the day it opened, and an interim communique was issued two weeks into the proceedings to report that the new constitution and Lin's political report had been approved. The constitution and the political report, delivered on the first day of the congress, were released on 27 April, three days after the congress closed. The new Politburo was announced on 28 April, the day when the new Central Committee held its first plenum.

The eighth congress was held in two sessions, for two weeks in September 1956 and for two and a half weeks in May 1958.

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USSR - CHINA

MOSCOW CONDEMNS "MAO GROUP" FOR TRYING TO SCUTTLE DETENTE

Moscow's detente policy toward the West and Peking's vigorous effort to undercut it have brought the Sino-Soviet rivalry into sharper focus and made the likelihood of significant improvement in their relations as remote as ever. Brezhnev's gloomy assessment of Sino-Soviet relations in his 15 August Alma-Ata speech was sandwiched between two major PRAVDA articles under the authoritative byline "I. Aleksandrov" taking a sharply hostile approach to the China problem: A 7 August article denounced the Chinese in connection with a forceful appeal for communist unity in the wake of the late-July Crimea conference;* and a 26 August article developed a lengthy bill of particulars to indict Peking on the counts of sabotaging detente and promoting neutralist sentiments regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict.

As in the 7 August article, which also expressed concern over neutrality in the communist movement, the one on the 26th invoked the 1969 international party conference and its two predecessors in charging the Chinese with diverging from the "collectively" determined line of the communist movement.** The latest article reflected Soviet pique over Romania's determinedly independent stance, observing that the Chinese urge "individual" communist parties "at least to renounce criticism" of Peking and to assume a neutral position. The article cited the April CPSU plenum as denouncing Peking for struggling against cohesion within the communist movement, and claimed that Peking's foreign policy reflects most clearly its rupture with "class and Marxist-Leninist positions" in both theory and practice. Neither the second Aleksandrov article nor Brezhnev's 15 August speech cited peaceful coexistence as a basis for Sino-Soviet relations. The 7 August article had cited the April plenum as having reconfirmed Moscow's desire for normal relations based on peaceful coexistence, though the published plenum resolution had not in fact done so. Moscow is clearly having difficulty

* See the TRENDS of 8 August 1973, pages 1-3.

** Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies treated the second Aleksandrov article this month much as they did the first one. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland published the text of the article in their party dailies. Hungary carried a shorter version. Romania ignored both articles.

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defining its position on this matter, hoping to remove the ideological dimension from the Sino-Soviet negotiations but hesitant about reading the PRC out of the ranks of socialist states.

The 26 August article incorporated in full Brezhnev's 15 August remarks on the admittedly stalemated Sino-Soviet negotiations. Recalling that he had addressed this subject in Alma-Ata three years ago, Brezhnev put the blame squarely on the Chinese for the failure to achieve any "notable progress" toward improving state relations. He in effect demanded that the Chinese renounce their current policies toward the Soviet Union as the condition for an upturn in Sino-Soviet relations. Further spelling out the Soviet position, the 26 August PRAVDA article recalled that Moscow has repeatedly advanced "constructive" proposals on the border question and offered to conclude an agreement on nonuse of force more than two years ago.

Brezhnev's somber glance back at the years of stalemate contrasts with the sanguine tone of his remarks in Alma-Ata three years ago. While acknowledging at that time that the border talks were "going slowly," he did not blame the Chinese and instead stressed that Moscow is "not losing hope" and will "continue to display a constructive and patient approach" in the hope that the Chinese "will respond in the same way." Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev had arrived in Peking 13 days earlier to assume the post of chief Soviet negotiator at the talks. Similarly, Brezhnev's major conciliatory address in March 1972 had coincided with Ilichev's return to the Peking negotiations. Brezhnev's latest speech, delivered at a time of Ilichev's absence from Peking, contained only a pro forma assertion that Moscow's readiness to normalize relations with Peking, combined with resolute struggle against "Maoism as a trend hostile to Leninism," remains unchanged.

In addition to amplifying the communique on the Crimea meeting, Moscow's current polemical offensive may be timed for the Chinese party congress as well as next month's Algiers conference of nonaligned nations. It may have been with an eye to the latter that the latest Aleksandrov article struck at Peking's efforts to identify with the third world against the superpowers. The article also accused Peking itself of aspiring to become a nuclear superpower, and both the recent Chinese nuclear test and Mao's alleged 1957 remark about accepting the sacrifice of half of mankind were invoked to portray the Chinese as addicted to war as a primary political instrument.

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In view of the widely anticipated Chinese congress, it may be significant that the 26 August article repeatedly referred to "Mao Tse-tung's group," an anathema formula introduced in the landmark 27 November 1966 PRAVDA editorial article and justifying efforts to work within or outside China to overturn an illegitimate faction. In an intriguingly curious citation of a Khrushchev-era document on Sino-Soviet relations, the latest Aleksandrov article quoted a statement from the February 1964 CPSU plenum to the effect that Peking was virtually alining itself with the reactionary elements of imperialism. The article added that "this warning was not heeded in Peking."

The February 1964 plenum statement on China had been delivered by Suslov, in a show of unity behind Khrushchev, and was published belatedly seven weeks later. During that period there was a further exchange of letters between the two sides involving Soviet proposals to renew the abortive bilateral talks held in July 1963 and to prepare for a new international party conference. Suslov's February 1964 report called for a new conference in order to undertake a "collective" effort to promote communist unity. That an authoritative PRAVDA article now should recall as a "warning" the Suslov report's reference to Peking's convergence with "imperialism" may reflect a new effort by Moscow to probe Chinese leadership ranks for elements concerned that Peking may have gone too far toward antagonizing Moscow while moving closer to the West. As Suslov had called China's alliance with the communist countries the guarantee of its advancement along the path of socialism, the Aleksandrov article pointed out that China's socialist development can be assured not along the path of struggle against the Soviet Union but in "alliance and fraternal cooperation" with it.

Whatever elements the Soviets might hope to sway toward a more balanced position between the Soviet Union and the United States, the Aleksandrov article's repeated citations of Chou En-lai in an unfavorable context suggest that the Chinese premier is not Moscow's man. Moscow is thus not likely to be reassured by the Chouist orientation of the CCP congress that was in secret session at the time of the second Aleksandrov article.*

* See the China section of this issue of the TRENDS.

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INDOCHINA

DRV COMMENTATOR LAUDS STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH

After a hiatus of almost a year, Hanoi media have carried two articles attributed to "Chien Thang" (Victor)--a pseudonym that has appeared periodically in the past in connection with some of Hanoi's most outspoken arguments for the 1972 communist offensive and its sharpest criticism of detente with the United States. The current articles--published in the North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and broadcast by Hanoi radio on 18 and 25 August--appear to be arguing that a new military effort in South Vietnam could succeed. They thus stand in marked contrast to the essentially temporizing comment since the January peace agreement, which suggested that Hanoi was preserving its options while strengthening its forces and evaluating the situation in the South.

Since the provisions of the peace agreement which would have facilitated communist political gains in the South have not been implemented, it is not surprising that such a traditional proponent of decisive military action as Chien Thang should now be raising the question of eventually returning to a military confrontation. It would appear that his two articles may open a new round of debate over policy rather than reflect an official decision. The Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP)--which would be expected to ratify any major new program--is not known to have met in plenary session since the 20th plenum early in 1972. With the announcement that First Secretary Le Duan on 28 August left Moscow for home after his six-week vacation in the Soviet Union, the stage seems to be set for a leadership review of the post-agreement situation and the results of Le Duan's visits in Moscow and Peking as a necessary prelude to the adoption of a future course of action.

While the Chien Thang articles offered a pro forma pledge of determination to carry out the provisions of the Paris agreement and the 13 June joint communique, their main thrust was that the balance of forces in Indochina has shifted decisively and that the communists are in an advantageous position to achieve complete victory. The commentator maintained that the forces in the South are already adequate to launch an important military effort: "The southern revolution's forces in place (taij choox) now have sufficient strength to initiate developments of strategic significance." Clearly assuming North Vietnam's continued military

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involvement in the South, he also asserted that the North has always played "an extremely important role" in the balance of forces "in the entire country," and added: "Never before could the North's effect upon the revolution throughout the country develop as favorably as it is doing now."

Chien Thang touched upon other questions which would figure in a Hanoi debate over its future course of action in the South. For example, he indirectly deprecated the importance of U.S. economic aid for the North by noting that while some countries have been subverted by the bait of U.S. economic assistance, the Vietnamese could not be "seduced" by "riches." He similarly seemed to downplay the role of assistance from Vietnam's communist allies: acknowledging that past aid was "extremely important," he argued that the aid had to be used in Vietnamese conditions and that "our people's subjective effort was the most decisive factor."

BACKGROUND Chien Thang had been closely identified with the 1972 communist offensive: He signed an article published in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and the party paper NHAN DAN on 24 March 1972--six days before the offensive was launched--which set up Hanoi's rationale for the attacks, contending that the communists were in an advantageous position and that major battles by main forces were required to further alter the balance of forces. After the offensive was launched, a 10 April 1972 Hanoi report on the VWP 20th Plenum held earlier that year, made clear that the line pressed by Chien Thang was identical with the view endorsed by the plenum. As early as March 1971, Chien Thang had argued that conditions were ripe for communist attacks, and in a 2 August 1971 article he had stressed the importance of the role of main force units. His suspicions of the United States were reflected in a highly polemical article published a day later, on 3 August 1971, which responded to Peking's rapprochement with the United States with a comprehensive indictment of all who would moderate their "struggle" against the United States or shift the focus of that struggle from the "main enemy."

Prior to Chien Thang's recent resurfacing, his last previous article was published on 22 September 1972 in both the army and party dailies. In light of Hanoi's presentation of its comprehensive draft peace agreement to the United States at the secret Paris talks two weeks later, on 8 October, Chien Thang seemed to be arguing against

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any major concessions in the negotiations. Warning against Nixon's "crafty diplomatic tricks" and putting the best possible face on the military situation, he contended that Saigon's army could not handle communist main-force attacks and that the U.S. air and naval forces would not be able to compensate for Saigon's earlier losses.*

* Previous Chien Thang articles are discussed in the TRENDS of 4 and 18 August 1971, and 12 January, 29 March, 12 April, 3 May, 23 August, and 27 September 1972.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW ATTACKS DETENTE FOES, WARNS OF IDEOLOGICAL SUBVERSION

While drawing the lines of battle with Peking in terms calculated to portray the latter as pro-imperialist and anti-socialist, Moscow has been applying a similar tactic to sharpen the lines of ideological struggle in the West. Apparently believing that a divide and conquer strategy will help stem any erosion of ideological allegiance in a period of detente, as well as stiffen East European support for its policies. In the forthcoming rounds of East-West negotiations, Moscow has stepped up its attacks on alleged opponents of detente in the West. In a series of commentaries over the past several weeks, Moscow has projected an image of growing reaction in the West to the trend toward improved East-West relations. At the same time, it has stressed the potential dangers of detente itself, warning that the enemies of socialism can use it to undermine the socialist countries' vigilance and unity.

EXTERNAL THREAT In depicting the growth of reaction in the West, Moscow has employed a device made familiar during the years of Stalinist repression. In a virtual paraphrase of Stalin's dictum that the class struggle intensifies as the goal of socialism approaches, a commentator on the Moscow domestic service on 20 August explained: "the deeper detente goes the more violent will be the resistance from the reactionary forces." In this light, he went on to detail activities in the FRG over the past year which allegedly illustrated the efforts of the forces represented by such figures as Axel Springer and Franz Joseph Strauss to block the progress toward East-West detente. Other familiar targets of Moscow's criticism have been trotted out in other commentaries. The German transmitter Deutsche Welle was attacked in a LITERARY GAZETTE article on 15 August. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty came in for sharp criticism in a Yuriy Zhukov commentary on Moscow domestic service on 18 August. Even the new U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was given a critical profile in RED STAR on 18 August, although Moscow has refrained from attacking U.S. policy directly.

Along with these familiar targets, Moscow has attacked what it describes as an upsurge of neo-fascism in the West. In an article entitled "The Black International," carried in LITERARY GAZETTE on 15 August, author Ernst Henri described the emergence throughout Western Europe of reactionary terrorist organizations

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"stirred to fury" by detente. Spiced with references to "execution squads," secret staffs nestled in Bavaria and the like, the article conveyed the impression that such organizations threaten the political stability of Western Europe. "Is it fortuitous," the author asked, "that in recent months. . . reports on the wild attacks of new fascist bands are arriving almost continuously from different countries of the capitalist world?"

INTERNAL THREAT Along with the crude attacks on the alleged foreign enemies of detente, Moscow has stressed the more subtle internal dangers posed by detente. It has pointedly warned against the theory, allegedly perpetrated by bourgeois ideologists, that detente signifies the onset of a new era in international relations in which class conflicts are superseded by world brotherhood. "It is impossible to say that all men are brothers," said Yuriy Zhukov in a Moscow domestic service commentary on 18 August. Expanding on this theme in a PRAVDA article on 21 August, F. Ryzhenko complained that such ideas were similar to those of the Maoists and were designed to "dispute the essentially revolutionary foreign policy of the USSR." Linking his concerns to the freedom of exchanges issue in the forthcoming CSCE, Ryzhenko asserted that the problems of the ideological struggle "cannot be the subject of interstate talks."

Although there has been little reflection as yet in East European media of the more aggressive line that Moscow has been taking on detente and the ideological struggle, the Ryzhenko article has been given wide play. Warsaw's TRYBUNA LUDU and the GDR's NEUES DEUTSCHLAND of 23 August published the text. Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO, also on the 23d, carried an abridged version of it. To date, the article has not appeared in the main Czechoslovak organs, but on 21 August, RUDE PRAVO carried an independent article on the same theme. Rejecting the view, ascribed to political observers, that a sort of "de-ideologizing" of political life was taking place on a world scale, it asserted that such ideas were intended among other things to lull the vigilance of the socialist countries.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW OFFERS COUNTERCHARGES TO SCHLESINGER MIRV ANNOUNCEMENT

Belatedly, Moscow has responded to Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 17 August press conference announcement on Soviet MIRV development by offering countercharges of its own about U.S. strategic plans. In limited commentary, Moscow has accused the Pentagon of hoping to circumvent the prevention of nuclear war agreement and impede SALT by accelerating the qualitative strategic arms race on grounds of U.S. military weakness. An allegedly reactivated effort by U.S. "military circles" and "cold war" journalists has been linked to the annual debate on the U.S. military budget.

Five days after Schlesinger's remarks, Moscow broke a lengthy silence on U.S. strategic developments, dating from before the June summit, to charge in a brief TASS item in the 22 August RED STAR that the United States was "energetically developing a series of new strategic weapons," citing in particular the Pentagon's interest in cruise missiles. On the 26th both the Moscow radio domestic service roundtable on foreign affairs and PRAVDA's weekly international review alluded to renewed attempts in the United States to fuel the arms race but did not mention Schlesinger's remarks directly. In the only linkage to SALT, Georgiy Ratiani in the PRAVDA review said that "attempts are being made to create some kind of obstacle to the next round of the negotiations on limiting strategic arms."

Not until 29 August, in an IZVESTIYA commentary available to date only in TASS summary, did Moscow acknowledge that Secretary Schlesinger's remarks were at issue. While continuing to eschew direct discussion of MIRV, IZVESTIYA noted that Schlesinger had revived the "well-worn thesis of an alleged Soviet threat," and it linked the timing of his statement to Congressional debate on the military budget. The commentary showed some concern that the charges advanced by opponents of detente were finding support "in official circles of Washington as well," as evidenced by Schlesinger's news conference.

The cautious treatment of Schlesinger's remarks indicates that Moscow is searching for a satisfactory public response in the wake of the June summit and the prevention of nuclear war agreement. Since those events--treated as a watershed in U.S.-Soviet relations--Moscow has sought to softpedal disagreements with the United States on nuclear issues and to portray a mutual concern to limit the arms

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race and reduce the threat of a nuclear war. That posture is greatly influenced by Moscow's desire to isolate Peking on issues of war and peace. Confirming Moscow's worst fears, Peking has jumped on Schlesinger's expression of concern about Soviet intentions, and Western press reaction to it, to depict unabated contention between the superpowers, continuation of the strategic arms race and increasing difficulty in the strategic arms negotiations in spite of the summit agreements.

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KISSINGER APPOINTMENT

MOSCOW'S EAST EUROPE ALLIES REGISTER GENERAL APPROVAL

In line with its current discreet posture on U.S. affairs, Moscow has so far confined itself to reporting Kissinger's appointment as Secretary of State, leaving the comment to its East European allies. Soviet media have gone no further than to note, in a brief Moscow domestic service item on the 23d, that the change had been predicted in the U.S. press for some time. East European comment has been generally favorable, noting Kissinger's skills in statecraft and his achievements in detente diplomacy. In some of the commentaries, the change was viewed as an attempt to offset the impact of Watergate.

HUNGARY, POLAND The most favorable assessments came from Budapest and Warsaw. Hungarian reaction was typified by a commentary in MAGYAR NEMZET on the 23d which viewed Kissinger's new appointment as a step toward the main goal shared by the President and him--"to maintain a state of tranquillity on our globe." This goal, it added, while not the same as Lenin's doctrine of peaceful coexistence, has nonetheless signified a change in U.S. foreign policy from confrontation to cooperation. Tacitly approving the President's position on Watergate, the commentary said the Kissinger appointment indicated the seriousness of the President's declaration in his 15 August speech that the time had come for the United States to turn away from Watergate and "concern itself with portentous political tasks whose solution must not be delayed for long."

The Polish Government daily ZYCIE WARSZAWY commented on the 24th that it was "obvious" that Kissinger's appointment would "give fresh impetus to Washington's foreign policy," since it revived the American tradition of having a Secretary of State second in importance only to the President. The same paper the next day stressed that the "complicated" state of U.S. foreign relations demanded the kind of "imagination, pragmatism," and "realism combined with cool reckoning of the U.S.'s own interests" that Kissinger would bring to his new position.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Prague and East Berlin took a characteristically
EAST GERMANY harder look at Kissinger's prospects for
 success in his new position, while at the
same time conceding his qualifications and achievements. Thus a
commentary in the Prague domestic service on the 24th, keyed to

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Kissinger's press conference the previous day, opined that even his undeniable popularity and skill as a negotiator could not insure a successful visit to Europe by President Nixon. "Not even Kissinger's personal charm," the talk added, could overcome the "independence" of the allies of the United States in Europe, inferring from Kissinger's remarks that the President's projected fall trip to Europe might be postponed. A Bratislava PRAVDA article, also on the 24th, backhandedly attributed Kissinger's achievements regarding Vietnam and the major communist powers to his alleged realization early in the 1960's of the limits of U.S. power in world affairs.

GDR comment on the appointment was sharply skeptical about the prospects for any basic change in U.S. foreign policy. Thus a Burkhardt talk on the East Berlin domestic service on the 23d minimized the possibility of change and viewed the appointment as a means of gaining greater flexibility in the conduct of foreign affairs and in dealing with domestic opponents of the President's foreign policies. On the score of Watergate, the commentary observed that "it may be true" that Rogers resigned because of differences with the President on this matter, since Watergate "reflects one of the basic problems of the crisis in the top political leadership of the United States."

YUGOSLAVIA A Moscow-dated dispatch carried by TANJUG on the 23d erroneously reported that the new Kissinger assignment had been "neither announced nor commended upon in Moscow." In fact, Moscow domestic service had reported the event on the morning of the 23d, after TASS and a Moscow broadcast in English to North America had reported it the previous day. The TANJUG dispatch hastened to note, however, that "observers in Moscow" have every reason to believe that the Soviet Union welcomes the appointment. The change was seen in the largely favorable Belgrade comment as leading to greater efficiency in U.S. decision-making in foreign affairs. POLITIKA's New York correspondent on the 26th conjectured that Rogers' resignation had been influenced by his disenchantment over Watergate.

ALBANIA Vituperation against the President, which has been especially marked in Tirana's comment on the United States since the Brezhnev visit, pervaded the slanted reports on the President's press conference carried by the Tirana radio on the 23d and ATA the next day. The ATA report, under the heading "Nixon's New Attempts to Conceal the Corruption of His Cabinet," said the President "made haste to announce" Kissinger's appointment in order to avoid "at times through tricks and at times brutally" questions concerning Watergate, on which subject he "played through to the end the role of the hypocrite."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 20 - 26 AUGUST 1973

<u>Moscow (2879 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1091 items)</u>		
World University Games, Moscow	(6%)	7%	Domestic issues	(48%)	39%
China	(7%)	7%	Tricontinental Table	(1%)	18%
Romanian National Day	(--)	6%	Tennis Tournament, Peking		
Award to Kazakh SSR	(15%)	5%	USSR Czech Invasion 5th Anniversary	(--)	9%
Central African Republic President in USSR	(--)	4%	Tlatelolco Treaty on LA Nuclear-Free Zone	(--)	7%
Asian Collective Security	(1%)	3%	Gambodia	(20%)	4%
Indochina	(3%)	2%	USSR MIRV Tests	(--)	2%
			Vietnam	(1%)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.